



Society for Cinema & Media Studies

Nothing on but Hoppy Badges: "Hopalong Cassidy," William Boyd Enterprises, and Emergent Media Globalization

Author(s): Michael Kackman

Source: *Cinema Journal*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Summer, 2008), pp. 76-101

Published by: University of Texas Press on behalf of the Society for Cinema & Media Studies

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20484413>

Accessed: 10-02-2018 01:39 UTC

REFERENCES

Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:

http://www.jstor.org/stable/20484413?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

University of Texas Press, Society for Cinema & Media Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Cinema Journal*

Nothing On But Hoppy Badges: *Hopalong Cassidy*, William Boyd Enterprises, and Emergent Media Globalization

by Michael Kackman

Abstract: This article explores the development of the Hopalong Cassidy trans-media commercial intertext in the 1940s and 1950s. Hopalong was not only a prominent part of U.S. postwar children's consumer culture, but also offers a revealing portrait of the development of international television syndication and merchandising.

Beginning with his first appearance in Clarence Mulford's Western novels nearly a century ago, Hopalong Cassidy was among the most enduring of U.S. trans-media figures. First adapted for film in 1935, *Hopalong Cassidy* features became staples of the U.S. B-Western matinee circuit of the 1930s and 1940s. The films' star, William Boyd, purchased all rights to the Hopalong Cassidy character in the late 1940s when the B-Western seemed a moribund prewar relic. Eventually, Boyd would license Hoppy adaptations for television, radio, comic books, newspaper comics, and serials, all of which helped promote a highly profitable series of tie-in toys and other children's products (Figure 1).

Hopalong is nostalgically remembered today as one of the most prominent of American 1950s children's television Westerns, but it was also among the very first internationally distributed U.S. programs. By the early 1950s, William Boyd Enterprises had developed a multitiered syndication model that included dubbed and subtitled telefilms for European and Latin American television and theatrical distribution, both syndicated and locally produced radio programs across three continents, comic strips in hundreds of newspapers worldwide, a highly profitable line of comic books, and thousands of licensed ancillary "tie-ups" (what we now typically call tie-ins). By the middle of the decade, *Hopalong* was airing on TV and/or radio in Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, Australia, and most of Western Europe, with development plans well underway for Eastern Europe and North Africa.

Michael Kackman is an assistant professor in the Department of Radio-Television-Film at the University of Texas at Austin, where he teaches courses in television history and media studies. He is the author of *Citizen Spy: Television, Espionage, and Cold War Culture* (Minnesota, 2005), and coeditor of the forthcoming *Flow TV: Essays on a Convergent Medium*.

© 2008 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819

76 *Cinema Journal* 47, No. 4, Summer 2008




Figure 1. (William Boyd Collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming)

Television historians like Chris Anderson have shown how, by the late 1950s, the Western was among the first genres via which the major motion picture studios entered television production. Here, though, I want to look at an earlier Western production cycle that has largely been overlooked by media scholars; easily dismissed as children's entertainment, programs like *Hopalong Cassidy* are further obscured by their place at the margins of network television programming. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, numerous B-Westerns (featuring stars such as Lash Larue, Gabby Hayes, Gene Autry, and Duncan Renaldo) made a curious transition to television—first through locally aired reedited film serials, and eventually through national syndication and network distribution of newly produced television series. J. Fred MacDonald has observed that the first TV Western stars were “the sagebrush champions of vintage B-Western feature films. This was an improbable development, since the bulk of these low-budget movies had been made for theatrical distribution in the 1930s. By the time they came to video in the late 1940s and early 1950s, many of their cowboy stars were middle-aged, retired, or deceased.”¹ As Anderson notes in his account of Warner Bros.’ development of telefilm Westerns for ABC in the 1950s, the earliest TV Westerns not only relied on the popularity of aging film stars, they also recycled old film footage as well. Even after resuming new production, some series reused establishing shots and action sequences, sometimes going so far as to have an editor on location to help maintain visual continuity with the reused footage.²

Independent nonnetwork production and distribution practices are still only partially understood, particularly in the first decades of U.S. television. Historical traces of the development of this aspect of the television industry are often only

obliquely visible, literally or figuratively in the footnotes of histories of network practices. In many instances, though, independents led the development of new modes of production and distribution; the first-run radio and television syndicator Frederick Ziv helped establish the viability of telefilm, and was joined by such companies as Desilu and Four Star in solidifying telefilm as the dominant form of television production by the middle of the 1950s.³ Though Boyd never branched out into producing anything other than *Hopalong Cassidy*-related media, the development of his company is noteworthy, not only as a marker of a new production paradigm driven by independent producers, but also as one of the first U.S. programs to exploit the media globalization that would rapidly accelerate by the 1960s.

We typically think of global television as a development, initially, of the emergent cultural and economic internationalization of the 1960s, and, secondly and more powerfully, of the highly consolidated multinational conglomerate media environment that has characterized the past twenty years. And, indeed, these assumptions are not exactly false; the preeminent global television market MIP-TV was formed in 1963 amid a period of rapid expansion of television economies and technological infrastructures, and we can trace those early endeavors forward to the current moment, in which the major Hollywood studios alone garner \$3 billion annually in international television sales for the diversified media corporations of which they are a part. Our scholarship has often mirrored these assumptions; as the multinational media empires have extended their reach, we have developed critiques of global political economy and subsequently complicated them by considering the extra-, sub-, or even counter-national negotiations of meaning that occur when the global and the local intermingle. However, international television distribution did not begin in the 1960s, and it did not become a matter of widespread economic, political, and scholarly concern only in the 1980s and 1990s. Here, I want to return to an earlier, mostly unexamined period and consider the distribution mechanisms and logics developed by the producers and distributors of *Hopalong Cassidy*, first for U.S. domestic sales, and nearly concurrently for an emerging international television market.

The actual mechanics of international television syndication are only beginning to be discussed critically. I have previously explored the growing importance of international revenues to U.S. telefilm studio production in the 1960s, Denise Bielby and Lee Harrington have extended previous scholarship on transnational cultures of reception by exploring the impact of international distribution on contemporary U.S. soap opera production practices, and Timothy Havens is among the very few scholars working to map international syndication markets and open a dialogue about their cultural implications.⁴ It is tempting to see the development of off-network and other secondary syndication efforts as just that—secondary economic practices that attempt to wring every last dollar out of an intellectual property that has already generated its primary revenues. But, as these scholars have shown, international distribution has for decades been a crucial source of revenue, and concerns about those markets have directly shaped the production of

U.S. programs. And in the case of *Hopalong Cassidy*, all distribution post-1947 was secondary, interrupted only by the infusion of a few new episodes shot for television in the early 1950s; the distinctions between Boyd's domestic and international sales practices are those of scale and context, not kind. Furthermore, the sum of Boyd's industrial practices was not a Fordist *extraction* of value through distribution of a finite commodity. Instead, a closer look at the Boyd company shows a much more dynamic process, involving the ongoing *creation* of value through extending the reach of an intellectual property.

Though the Mumford novels were the origin of the character, Hoppy's migration to film signaled the beginning of a series of transformations that make it difficult to fix a single textual point of origin for what *Hopalong* was, or what it meant. Particularly if we look at the span of business and textual practices associated with *Hopalong Cassidy* from 1947 onward, what emerges is a series of attempts to extend the longevity not of a film series, or television program, or comic book, but of a brand. *Hopalong* made its way to television amid a period of considerable transition: from live to telefilm; from network, to independent, to studio production; from local syndication to network distribution; from national to increasingly international media distribution mechanisms; and, particularly tellingly, from an intellectual property climate shaped by copyright to a more stringent paradigm ruled by the binding legal framework of trademark law. The path that *Hopalong Cassidy* and William Boyd Enterprises navigated through those transitions is a revealing one that complicates our understandings of the development of media globalization in the postwar era.

William Boyd and the Making of a Commercial Intertext.

America's children, the country's most ruthless pressure group, bring in a bonanza for a middle-aged actor who corralled television rights to a cowboy nobody wanted.

Life magazine, 1950⁵

From 1935 to 1943, William Boyd starred in fifty-four hour-long *Hopalong* films, produced by Harry Sherman for Paramount. After a series of contract and production disputes, Boyd self-produced another twelve films in 1946 and 1947 that were distributed theatrically by United Artists. By 1948, the apparent value of the films was on the wane, and it seemed likely that future revenues would continue to dwindle as they grew ever more dated. That year, William Boyd arranged to purchase the original Sherman films, as well as the nontheatrical rights to the character that had been retained by writer Clarence Mulford. After a series of complex negotiations and a personal investment of \$400,000, by the end of 1948, Boyd owned all television and other nontheatrical rights to the original films and any future uses of the Hopalong character.

Hopalong Cassidy first aired on U.S. television in local syndication, beginning with KTLA in Los Angeles in 1948, and rapidly expanding to other local markets. The old films, though, were rather hastily adapted for the new medium, which prompted frustration from local stations. Inconsistent running times and title

sequences caused some scheduling difficulties, requiring uneven starting times and inconsistent allotments for commercial announcements.⁶ Nonetheless, by 1950, the show was a #1 hit in dozens of cities, and NBC contracted to syndicate it nationally. Licenses for individual episodes that had sold initially for \$300 reached \$1,000 for their third or fourth airing in some markets.⁷ NBC's syndicated *Hopalong* prices in 1950 ranged from a low of \$225—the sustaining rate in Albuquerque—to \$2,900 for sponsored episodes in New York City. Per-episode fees in most mid-sized cities were in the \$400–\$800 range.⁸ NBC was concerned, though, that the program's dated source material was too plainly obvious. Tired of “apologizing for its being a ‘western film,’” they prepared a new opening sequence to make it less obvious that it was a repackaged collection of 1930s oaters.⁹

NBC drew ire from local stations when, in 1951, it converted the program into a network series, disrupting existing syndication deals and increasing the exposure of the already ubiquitous cowboy star. NBC moved the show to the network without waiting for newly produced, or even previously untelevised, episodes. As a result, there were sometimes three separate sources of Hoppy programming in particular cities. NBC, William Boyd, and distributor Toby Anguish (who remained in conflict with NBC over distribution rights to some episodes into the early 1950s) continued to flood the market with *Hopalong* reruns.¹⁰ Local station owners were incensed to learn that their competitors were also airing the show, siphoning away audiences and causing tensions with local advertisers. One Texas station owner, frustrated with the glut of *Hopalong* episodes, wrote to the chairman of NBC, complaining, “If it were not for the fact that we had already started the series and run six episodes, I would be delighted to tell NBC what they could do with Cassidy and his beautiful white horse, but under the circumstances cannot afford to do so.”¹¹ The network initially aired thirty-four previously syndicated episodes under the national sponsorship of General Foods, while Boyd cut down an additional twelve films from the previously untelevised United Artists catalog and developed plans for new production.¹² NBC continued to run the entire catalog of recut matinee films both on the network and in syndication well into the mid-1950s.¹³

In 1952, Boyd went back into production, shooting fifty-two more films—the first that were created explicitly for television. These were typically shot in ten days each for \$100,000 per episode, and they were heavily promoted as being newly televisual, with an emphasis on close-ups and tempered action that would not offend parents' sensibilities.¹⁴ In a 1953 promotional interview, Boyd told audiences,

Last fall, I began to produce my own films, especially for NBC television, and I like to think these have been a lot more enjoyable than those ancient epics that rode right into your living room and seemed to shoot up the whole house. That's one thing I'm trying to change in these new films. They're made and designed strictly for television, and in them I keep noise down to a minimum. I can see Mom's point that when she's whipping up a cake in the kitchen, she doesn't want to be distracted by a bunch of

cowhands yelling so loud that they sound as though they're behind the oven door. This kind of high-pitched noise was okay for the theaters, but when a movie is coming into your living room, it's nice to know your roof is going to stay on.¹⁵

Television, though, was only a portion of the Hoppy character's reach. By 1950, a licensed radio show reached a U.S. audience of 25 million over 500 Mutual stations, 36 million comic books were being sold annually, and 56 million readers saw Hoppy's comic strip in 150 daily newspapers.

These sites of transmedia exploitation were, however, dwarfed by the proliferation of Hoppy-related nonmedia merchandise. From toy guns and the majority of American children's Western wear sales to wristwatches and the nation's top-selling wallpaper pattern two years in a row, Hopalong Cassidy's most visible points of entry into 1950s American popular culture were the department store and supermarket, not the living room. Merchandising contracts exploded in the late 1940s. The arrangement was simple, and staggeringly lucrative: in exchange for the use of the Hopalong Cassidy name and likeness, Boyd received 5 percent of gross sales. In just one representative month in 1950, for example, the United States Time Corporation sold 54,085 Hoppy-labeled Timex watches, generating a royalty payment to Boyd of \$8,949.42.¹⁶ The compensation for food products was lower (around 1.25 cents per gallon of ice cream, for example), but the cumulative profits were enormous. Hoppy generated \$70 million in merchandise sales by 1950; Boyd's 1954 press kit claimed that figure reached \$120 million, and, when including food products like bread and dairy, sales reached \$500 million annually. Some 2,500 products licensed by over 200 manufacturers generated a steady flood of revenue for which the television series was but a promotional device (Figure 2).

A promotional kit told potential sponsors, "Hoppy is probably the only 'personality' with such all-over power in ALL FORMS of advertising such as TV, radio, newspaper comics, magazines, books, records, movies, etc.; therefore when he appears in person he draws crowds of tremendous size. ... It is now planned that in 1953 and 1954 Hoppy will make more personal appearances than ever. Make sure that if Hoppy comes to your town that he is endorsing your products and not your competitors."¹⁷ Rather than simply promote Hoppy-branded merchandise, then, this marketing system encouraged licensees to see Hoppy as a supplement to, not a replacement of, their own recognized name. The promotional kit continued,

We do not advocate that any company use this program to the detriment of their own trade name; in fact, we recommend that Hoppy be used to endorse the company's present trade name. In this manner, you don't lose your identity, YOU GAIN ALL THE PRESTIGE THAT GOES WITH HOPPY TO TELL THE PEOPLE IN YOUR PARTICULAR AREA THAT HOPPY'S FAVORITE IS YOUR TRADE NAME.¹⁸

This was a crucial distinction, for what was being sold was not a product, but a brand that was broadly dispersed, even globalized, but also localized. The use of dairy and bread promotions was an especially apt mechanism for this marketing strategy, because these staple foods could be broadly associated with the Hopalong

Figure 2. Hoppy fans modeled their Western outfits before one of Boyd's public appearances (William Boyd Collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming).



character but simultaneously localized through spot advertisements, tie-ins and other promotions, and product labeling by a local producer (Figures 3–4).

In Boyd's business plans, direct profits from film and television rentals were always secondary to merchandising and licensing. In fact, once he had secured full rights to the character, he actively sought to sell off the programming. In 1950, he offered to relinquish rights to all his pictures to NBC for a flat rate of \$100,000, including an agreement that the network would have the right to purchase all future Hoppy telefilms. NBC saw little long-term value in the programming and declined the offer, though they happily aired the series on the network and via syndication for the next several years. What Boyd wanted to retain control of, notably, was sponsorship contracts (including restricting cereal, pudding, and frozen food contracts to General Foods, already sponsor of his radio show), in order to ensure a close correspondence between sponsorship agreements and his merchandising business.¹⁹ Indeed, the combination of television sponsorship by food companies with local endorsement contracts for similar products helped to establish Hoppy as a figure whose reach extended well beyond children's television. Hopalong's heavy promotion through consumer goods and food likely contributed to the show's increased visibility among adults, with significantly more adults who were either viewers of, or familiar with, the program than other child-oriented programs such as *Kukla Fran & Ollie* and *The Lone Ranger*. In 1951, the network audience for *Hopalong* was estimated to be 28 percent adult men, 27 percent adult women, and 45 percent children under 16.²⁰ Far from being just a children's television icon, Hopalong was a fixture in American daily life.

Hoppy's visibility and effectiveness as a promotional vehicle was continually reinforced by regular references across the various media in which he appeared. In her study of the development of the teen girl production cycle in the 1940s and 1950s, Mary Celeste Kearney explores the self-referentiality of transmedia exploitation, which often involves "first, the repeated *adaptation* of an established entertainment text into different media forms ... and second, the *promotion* of a text's reputation as a successful entertainment property when marketing later versions produced in other formats."²¹ What makes *Hopalong Cassidy* so fascinating in this context is that the ultimate commodity being sold was not principally further adaptations, but the character's continued viability as a promotional vehicle. We often think of merchandising as a profitable secondary market—a way to extract as much profit as possible from a popular media figure or text. But in the case of Hoppy, merchandising and sponsorship contracts were the primary site of industrial exchange, and may well have been the *primary* site of cultural encounter with the character. In other words, merchandise was not used to extend the viability and popularity of the primary texts; instead, in both economic and cultural terms, it eventually *became* the primary text, supported *by* the films, television programs, and other adaptations.

In this sense, *Hopalong* was an early instance of what Eileen Meehan has called a commercial intertext—a branded sequence of interwoven texts, associated products, and promotional practices that collectively constitute the raw materials for cultural exchange around a media figure.²² Crucial to both the economic and cultural logics of the commercial intertext is that licensed products and associated media are not simply derivative of an original text, but are central to its appeal and commercial success. In her careful analysis of the development of the Batman commercial intertext surrounding the 1989 Warner Bros. film of the same title, Meehan shows how transmedia marketing practices have become normative in our contemporary cultural and economic climate via the synergistic practices of multimedia conglomerates. The Hoppy commercial intertext differs crucially from more recent examples, though, in that it was not a product of a highly integrated multinational media conglomerate like the one Warner Bros. became in the 1980s. Hoppy was not the product of smoothly engineered synergy—whether that of today's Time Warner or even that of the emergent Disney empire in the 1950s.²³ Tellingly, none of the major media corporations associated with Hoppy—from Paramount, United Artists, and NBC to the King Features syndicate that distributed Hoppy newspaper comics—was sufficiently horizontally diversified to develop the character's commercial potential alone. Constrained by their narrow industrial niches, they either were not interested in, or were unable to take advantage of, the Hoppy commercial intertext. Instead, it was precisely Boyd's independent status that made his exploitation of the Hoppy intertext across a wide range of industries possible; it was likely Boyd's lack of commitment to a particular medium that made possible the development of what would quickly become a global brand.

“SAY, PARDNERS! I’LL BE SEEING YOU SATURDAY, JULY 10, AT EXCELSIOR AMUSEMENT PARK!”

“Kids — be one of my 4-M Rangers. Drink at least 4 glasses of milk every day!”

“If you wanna be like Hoppy, you gotta eat like Hoppy, and drink plenty of Hoppy’s Favorite Milk!”

(SIGNED) *Hopalong Cassidy*

Kids, tell your folks! Mom 'n Dad, plan to take the kids!

America’s greatest cowboy, Hopalong Cassidy himself, will be at Excelsior Amusement Park Saturday, July 10. He’ll put on two shows, one at 1:30, another at 3:30. (And he’ll be around for autographs afterwards, too!) All you have to do to see Hoppy is tear off the cover of the July 9 issue of TV Guide! That’s your ticket! It’ll admit two people—and, it’s good for two free rides, too! So, come on out and see Hoppy and have a wonderful time! Remember, Saturday, July 10!

See HOPPY ON TV (WCCO-CHANNEL 4) at 8 P.M. EVERY SATURDAY NIGHT!

Sponsored by

NORTHLAND MILK  **MINNESOTA MILK** 

in Minneapolis ★ RE. 7211 in St. Paul ★ CA. 6-3431

Figure 3. “If you wanna be like Hoppy, you gotta eat like Hoppy.” Hoppy’s likeness appeared in ads and on products, but always as support for, not a replacement of, local brand names (William Boyd Collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming).

The Hoppy intertext depended on the conflated public image of Hoppy, the character, and William Boyd, the star. Whereas the Hopalong Cassidy of the Mulford novels was a bewhiskered rascal, Boyd transformed both the character and his own public persona into figures of unimpeachable character and responsible civic leadership. The cultural landscape of Hoppy films is one of minimal violence or cultural conflict. In the Boyd-produced films, “one or two deaths in a picture are enough for anybody. Likewise, sheep and cattle feuds are out; there are no mortgaged ranches with the three beautiful daughters standing on the veranda, bidding tearful good-bys to the old homestead; and there are no Indians.” Though Boyd admitted that the absence of Native Americans had mostly to do with union talent contracts, the cumulative result is that most of the films’ plots hinged more upon Hoppy’s moral leadership and investigative acumen than violent action.²⁴ A barrage of trade and popular press accounts celebrated how he had single-handedly “turned the back-country range hand into a paragon of uprightness and clean living.”²⁵ In developing the Cassidy persona, Boyd relied heavily on public service outreach, and he cultivated strong connections to local civic institutions; churches, social clubs, and schools were regular stops on his frequent travels. He logged some 100,000 miles a year doing local promotional appearances, often with his



Figure 4. A Hoppy billboard outside a grocery store (William Boyd Collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming).

horse Topper, and claimed to shake hands with a million kids annually. A single New York appearance in 1949 drew a crowd of 350,000 that effectively shut down midtown Manhattan for hours.²⁶ Press accounts regularly commented on how completely Boyd seemed to embody the Hoppy spirit, calling him “just plain good. He can be as enviable an example for his television followers as is the ‘Hopalong Cassidy’ character he plays” (Figures 5–6).²⁷

In popular discourses, both Hoppy and Boyd were often explicitly linked to normative discourses of citizenship. Like nearly all of the children’s Western stars of early television, Hoppy promoted a “cowboy code” to which two million members of his Troopers’ Clubs ascribed; it called for, among other things, obedience to parents, respect for authority, and patriotic pride.²⁸ Boyd was in heavy demand for appearances in parades and at other civic events. In 1950, for example, Boyd was invited to ride with President Truman in a parade on “I Am An American Day”—though he declined a seat in the presidential limousine in favor of Topper’s saddle, and he backed out completely when Truman canceled. Although Hoppy was popular among girls (and the company claimed that 40 percent of the merchandise they licensed was developed for girls), much of his public image focused on the value of his moral leadership for young boys. When he announced plans to lend his name and financial support to the development of a number of



Figure 5. Boyd rides in a parade, while his likeness watches from above (William Boyd Collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming).

youth camps for disadvantaged boys, Boyd was deluged with proposals, many from scouting and leadership organizations for boys. Hopalong was hailed explicitly as the kind of rugged role model that might offer an antidote to the perceived dangers of postwar “Momism.” Anthropologist Margaret Mead said of Hoppy, “With fathers away from family life so much in modern times, mothers are afraid the boys will imitate them instead of their fathers, and turn into sissies; they encourage their little boys to copy the current play ideal of masculinity.”²⁹ In acknowledgment, Boyd said that “Hoppy has temporarily replaced the fireman, the engineer, and the policeman that kids used to want to grow up to be. Now they want to be riding the range on a good horse, cleaning up the badmen.”³⁰

The civic identity promoted by Hoppy was closely articulated with consumerism, making the figure a central site around which tensions over postwar American childhood and consumerism were negotiated. The program and its commercial tie-ups were clearly among the most visible of the period’s many products that targeted children as a newly emergent market segment. In the postwar period, public commentators were increasingly critical of the emergent consumerist youth culture and the mass media that promoted it. One wrote of how



Figure 6. Boyd is greeted by a local school safety patrol (William Boyd Collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming).

Junior pined for more and more entertainment and he got it—almost always with the encouragement of his parents, who discovered that blood and thunder would pacify him almost as effectively as Seconal. ... On top of all this came television, which not only assaulted the childish ear, but (in the words of Fred Allen) threatened to change Americans into creatures with eyeballs as big as cantaloupes and no brain at all.³¹

But amid those tensions, Hoppy offered a more readily sanctioned and disciplined form of childhood consumerism, one that was discursively linked to civic responsibility and engagement, rather than the allegedly narcotic pleasures of television. Indeed, as Sean Griffin has suggested in his analysis of the children's play cultures that formed around Disney's Davy Crockett in the 1950s, such relentlessly commercialized mass media figures ironically worked, through their invocation of childhood innocence and traditional values, as figurative antidotes to the corrupting influence of commercialism itself.³² Hoppy thus offered a children's corollary to what Lizabeth Cohen has called the "citizen consumer." Rather than a claim of citizenship that stood in rigid opposition to commercialization, the citizen consumer found public voice and civic participation *within* new postwar consumer identities.³³

The Hoppy intertext was a highly productive site for the elaboration of this childhood citizen consumer, not just because of the appeal of the program and its tie-ups, but because of the figure of Boyd himself. Newspaper and magazine articles often emphasized the degree to which Boyd embodied the spirit of the cowboy hero. One commentator wrote, "Whether in street clothes or in his famous black Hoppy garb, Boyd lives and breathes the very essence and spirit of the national hero Hoppy has become. And because he believes in Hopalong Cassidy,

every kid in American believes in him too.”³⁴ The singularity of Boyd’s association with the character for most audiences was clearly part of the tight connection, as were his public appearances and ubiquity as a commercial endorser. But also central to the connection of Boyd to the mythic Hoppy was Boyd’s own personal narrative. Boyd figured publicly as a kind of entrepreneurial patriot, an icon of an idealized American spirit. William Boyd the businessman was constructed in countless interviews and press accounts as a self-made man, a “dreamer with a penny” and a “self-made cowboy” who has “retapped the same deep vein of American character which made the Old West. . . . It is both his fate and his duty to strengthen the fiber of US youth.”³⁵ Boyd became a symbol simultaneously of a kind of historically derived moral authenticity and the possibility of financial success through entrepreneurship; these discourses together inflected Boyd’s cultural status as an icon for American children’s consumer citizenship.

International Syndication and the Building of a Global Brand.

How, for instance, is one to explain that fully a quarter of Cassidy’s fan mail, now well over 2,000 letters a week, comes from such unlikely places as Malta, Gibraltar, India, Africa, China, Turkey, and the Fiji Islands? These are places where, obviously, there is no television and, in most cases, no comic strip. The explanation may be that once a man sways the imagination of a people anywhere, the rest of the world will hear about it. About half the foreign mail comes from parents who want to know where they can buy Hopalong outfits. This is a problem for Boyd and his merchandising organization, who already have their hands full trying to take care of domestic consumers. However, they hope to open up the world market within a year.

Coronet magazine, 1950³⁶

When William Boyd Enterprises began to develop international distribution strategies in the early 1950s, merchandising possibilities were never far out of sight. *Hopalong* syndication sales were developed in collaboration with Paul Talbot’s Fremantle Corporation, which was among the very first independent international syndication firms. By the mid-1960s, international distribution of U.S. programming would become a \$100 million annual business, providing one-quarter to one-half of the programming aired worldwide.³⁷ But in the early 1950s, international television distribution was a speculative, tentative business. Seeking to be first to any particular television market, Fremantle was building a distribution system that relied on personal relationships and local expertise.

The arrangement between Fremantle and Boyd Enterprises was fairly simple. In exchange for a 30 percent commission, Fremantle would broker programs in virtually any country with a broadcast television industry, handling transportation, local representation, and arranging for dubbing and subtitling services. Not all of Boyd’s telefilms were distributed by Fremantle, since NBC retained some international distribution rights into 1954 and a few international relationships were developed directly by Boyd. Nonetheless, Fremantle had a powerful influence on the development of the new industry and Boyd’s place within it. Fremantle

sought to be the first Western programmer to arrive with reels of film and freshly inked contracts upon the announcement of a newly formed national television service. And because they were first, they often secured contracts before the implementation of regulations to protect local producers, such as the mid-1950s BBC cap of 14 percent foreign-produced programming, or Venezuela's regulations that allowed the use of commercial advertising only during programs produced with Venezuelan talent.³⁸

By 1953, Fremantle had extended its operations throughout Europe, Latin America, and the Pacific Rim and Australia. Initially using local subcontractors, Fremantle had by 1955 largely eliminated such brokers and had established its own international network of agents to handle local sales, coordinate dubbing and subtitling services, and arrange for inspection and shipping of prints. By the middle of the decade, Fremantle had successfully placed *Hopalong* telefilms on the air in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela, Hong Kong, and Japan, supplementing already-established sales to Cuba and Mexico, which had been airing *Hopalong* consistently since 1952.³⁹

Also, by mid-decade, Fremantle was rapidly expanding its *Hopalong* sales into continental Europe, beginning in Belgium, where the national television service prepared its own Flemish subtitles. France followed soon after, although in general, European sales were hampered by slow commercial television development and protective national regulations. It was not until 1958, for example, that such telefilms as "der Sheriff von Kansas" were cleared by the German national program review committee for international television imports.⁴⁰ These early years for Fremantle were a period of rapidly shifting cultural, political, and economic challenges. The company faced black-market infringement, unstable local politics, and recalcitrant customers. Fremantle was largely on its own in resolving trade conflicts; the company occasionally sought the aid of U.S. officials, but embassies were generally loathe to interfere with television services that produced news coverage about the United States. Furthermore, Fremantle was often a direct competitor to the U.S. Information Agency, which sought to promote its own free programming.⁴¹

Latin America proved particularly accessible to U.S. distributors, and Cuba was among the earliest developed and most profitable of the emerging Latin American television markets; *Hopalong* began airing there on CMQ Havana in 1952. At the same time, however, an unauthorized Cuban producer registered a copyright on the name "Hopalong Cassidy" and announced plans to develop a radio program. In response, CMQ approached Boyd in hopes of producing an authorized radio adaptation. Clearly, CMQ wanted to shut out the competition, and this simultaneously became an opportunity for Boyd Enterprises to solidify control over its intellectual property. The arrangement reached was that CMQ would self-produce a Spanish-language radio series and pay a flat copyright fee of \$80 per episode to Boyd. (Though Boyd was interested in distributing these episodes around Latin America, Cuban talent contracts for exported material would have

been prohibitively expensive, so the show remained local.) The program was aired live, with no recordings or subsequent rebroadcast. Copies of scripts were filed with Boyd Enterprises, but were given latitude in matters of plot and setting so long as they recognized “the importance of Hopalong Cassidy as a children’s idol and as a representative of the highest moral standards, ethics and behavior, and that the character will be so portrayed in the radio programs.”⁴² Boyd retained copyright of the scripts in both Cuba and the United States, and, most importantly, Boyd held all Cuban rights to use of the name Hopalong Cassidy in all commercial tie-ups and endorsements. In this case, as in the United States, the broadcast text was but a seed, a minor source of revenue that was ultimately more valuable as a means of establishing a larger market for both programming and goods.

In 1954, William Boyd embarked on a worldwide promotional tour that attempted to replicate globally what his many civic appearances had done in the United States to promote his programs and products. Traveling to dozens of countries, he and his wife Grace appeared before large crowds at a wide range of public events. His appearances often directly mirrored his U.S. promotional activities, and he supplemented them with radio and film addresses, direct mail campaigns, and newsletters. To support the European leg of his tour, he often offered an adapted version of the Cowboy Code of Honor that was a prominent feature of his comic books and fan clubs. In a radio address directed at Scottish children, for example, he said,

[Here] is what I tell children in the United States: Children in many foreign lands are less fortunate than you. Be glad and proud that you are an American. All of us over here are, naturally, proud that we are Americans and I am sure that each one of you kids over there is just as proud of your country. Remember, whether it’s America or Scotland, you kids have many advantages over children in other lands. Be proud of your country and be proud of all the advantages that it offers you.⁴³

Rather than avoid the overt appeals to patriotism that were a central aspect of his U.S. persona, Boyd here simply recast them slightly, constructing Hoppy as a benignly civic rather than narrowly nationalistic figure. Comparable statements were circulated globally, translated into local languages, and similarly nationalized, though the details of how those translations were prepared or adapted are unfortunately unavailable (Figure 7).

While Fremantle was in the business of selling television, Boyd Enterprises was selling something larger, but less concrete. Throughout much of the 1950s, Boyd’s international syndication revenues were, by comparison to U.S. profits, paltry. Typical license fees hovered around \$150 per episode in most foreign markets, out of which was deducted Fremantle’s commission and the not-inconsiderable transportation and development costs. (The intangible costs included the challenges of cultivating international relationships; before receiving Argentine distribution contracts, for example, Boyd was asked to make repeated personal assurances to President Peron that he would not use his cultural influence there to foment a coup.)⁴⁴ Fremantle forecast gross sales growth in Latin America for 1954



Figure 7. A promotional appearance for Trans World Airlines, a sponsor of Boyd's 1954 world tour, in which the cowboy hero introduces a multiracial group of British boys to the wonders of modern air travel (William Boyd Collection, American Heritage Center, University of Wyoming).

and 1955 at \$35,000–\$40,000 plus a roughly comparable amount in renewals of existing contracts.⁴⁵ This was not an inconsequential sum, particularly when added to comparable revenues from Europe, but considering the overhead and management costs, programming sales constituted but a tiny part of the overall Hoppy empire. It is difficult to see, for example, how a \$35-per-episode license fee in Hong Kong—an arrangement that required multiple visits by both Fremantle and Boyd representatives—could have been profitable in the short term. For Fremantle, such a deal offered incremental profits and an ongoing sales presence in a developing market, but for Boyd those sales could not have justified the expense.

But, rather than develop international distribution primarily as a means of selling programs, Boyd's energies were directed toward solidifying control over an international brand. Boyd Enterprises' attorneys sought to standardize their control of both copyright and trademark across multiple media and international contexts, and they intervened when they felt those rights were threatened.⁴⁶ They aggressively registered trademarks on Hoppy in every country where there was even a possibility of a developing market. These covered large classes of goods, and included, according to Boyd's business manager Maggie Cherry,

[H]ats, breeches, jodhpurs, sweaters, leather jackets, poplin jackets, gabardine jackets, bathing suits and trunks, neckties, neck scarves, sweat-shirts, play-suits, cowboy shirts, coats, blue pants, gloves, mittens, raincoats, ponchos, hosiery, young girls' outer clothing and various tops such as guns, bags, cuffs, spurs, wood-burning sets, television sets, shooting galleries, games and puzzles, dolls, balloons and inflated toys, cowboy ropes, roller skates, hand and string puppets, saddles, picture guns, magnetic dart games, paint and crayon sets, jigsaw puzzles and cut-out books.⁴⁷

Boyd Enterprises' attempts to expand product licensing into international markets shed a revealing light on the nascent processes of media globalization in the 1950s. One of the company's first international efforts was undertaken in Mexico, where it sought to replicate its U.S. merchandising successes. Despite the assistance of the U.S. Embassy and Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City, however, the company struggled throughout the early 1950s to find a way to develop a profitable Mexican merchandise business. Its initial proposal was to export U.S.-manufactured licensed goods into Mexico, but those plans were scuttled by manufacturing costs that were three to four times that of comparable Mexican products, as well as by Mexican tariffs, which added 40–100 percent to the wholesale cost. A Boyd executive wrote, "With a basically poor population, which fights for each crumb of bread, it becomes impossible and unrealistic to think in terms of importing any American goods which [can be] manufactured in Mexico" and which would thus be "subject to prohibitive duties."⁴⁸ The Boyd staff, though, continued to eye the markets in Latin America hopefully. They watched with anticipation as *The Howdy Doody Show* developed, but quickly abandoned, a locally produced Spanish-language program in Mexico City. The problem was not that there was no interest, but that television sales revenues alone could not sustain the production of the show, and the merchandising profits were too limited.

Unlike the rest of Latin America, rights to Mexican television distribution had been originally included in NBC's North American distribution rights to *Hopalong* telefilms. On March 1, 1954, though, NBC relinquished those rights, reporting that "we have thus far, however, been unable to make any commitments with respect to Mexico."⁴⁹ This admission is telling. NBC was looking for an immediate revenue stream, and likely found the overhead costs and limited license fees simply not worth the bother. They then returned the rights to Boyd, who turned the Mexican market over to Fremantle, which had the infrastructure and expertise in place to generate quick sales. Almost immediately, Fremantle signed a contract with Cadena Radifusora Mexicana for \$350 each for twenty-seven subtitled features, to be aired over a period of three years in Mexico City.⁵⁰ While Boyd Enterprises never surmounted the challenges to toy and other product merchandising in Mexico, food endorsements were more successful.⁵¹ Fremantle helped broker a Mexican sponsorship arrangement with Spur Cola, produced by Canada Dry. The television program was popular and received good ratings, though Boyd was ultimately disappointed that the Spur tie-in did not lead to further promotional and merchandising possibilities.⁵²

Boyd encountered similar challenges in attempting to expand product licensing in other countries. Boyd's researchers had been initially encouraged by the successful Hopalong series on Cuban television and radio, and they worked to develop product tie-ins to capitalize on the newly established brand. The lead agent working on the project, however, reported that

Merchandising opportunities south of the border are nil. ... All the shopping in Cuba is handled by maids. Children never go into the stores since groceries are usually set up as part of a bar. The supermarket, as we know it here, is unknown there, thus ruling out any of the obvious display merchandise tie-ups for sponsors. Premiums are out, too, because the postal services there are considered unreliable and people won't take a chance on sending or receiving money and goods through the mail.⁵³

In addition to exposing the socioeconomic class status of their preferred target audience ("all shopping is done by maids") this observation is particularly revealing in how concretely it evokes the cultural contexts within which Americans encountered Hoppy. In the United States, Hoppy was aggressively marketed to middle-class families, working from the assumption that children would urge their parents to buy Hoppy-labeled merchandise or food. Boyd's marketers, however, were less successful in adapting their efforts to non-U.S. consumer patterns. By the mid-1950s, Boyd's Latin American merchandising efforts were largely abandoned; only in Puerto Rico and oil-rich Venezuela did the company find optimism about tie-up possibilities, though merchandising there never approached anything near U.S. levels.⁵⁴

In Europe, a different challenge thwarted the spread of the Hopalong empire. While in Latin America, merchandising sales lagged due to economic disparities and the absence of a U.S.-style consumer commodity culture, weak sales of Hoppy merchandise in Europe were attributed to the low saturation level of *Hopalong* media. Radio and comics were successful there from the early 1950s onward, but Hoppy films were only sporadically visible either in theaters or on television. Foreign content restrictions limited U.S. distributors' access to French television, and Fremantle was still using subtitled rather than dubbed prints as late as 1961. The small market could not support the costs of dubbing new dialogue in French (typically triple the cost of subtitling), and the overall visibility of Hoppy remained low there. That year, Opera Mundi, the French company that oversaw merchandise licensing, declined to renew its contract with Boyd. The children's cowboy outfits they promoted did a brisk enough business, but they were not closely tied to the Hopalong Cassidy brand. "I am sorry that this experience has not been more fruitful," wrote an Opera Mundi executive. He continued,

If Hoppy's films were to be shown on TV regularly, it would undoubtedly build up the possibility of sales of licenses, but until such time, we find that the possible clients are rather reluctant as they contend that Hopalong Cassidy is not known enough in this country. Cowboy outfits are still popular, for instance, among young people, but the manufacturers simply produce such outfits without any name as the boys are not particularly interested in one cowboy more than in another.⁵⁵

The burgeoning global market for Hoppy products that in 1950 had led a *Coronet* reporter to speculate about limitless international merchandising possibilities had only been partially realized. Programming and merchandising sales were deeply intertwined, and a paucity of the former meant there would be no market for the latter.

The Hoppy commercial intertext was a product of a newly emergent U.S. postwar commodity culture, and it did not always translate transparently around the globe. The reach of the Hoppy figure depended on a range of economic factors, including favorable trade policies, inexpensive manufacturing, disposable income, and easily branded staple foods. But even more fundamentally, Hoppy required childhood, a protected space of both leisure and commodity consumption that could make the media figure a site of ongoing cultural and economic productivity.⁵⁶ Hoppy's international circulation never reached the saturation levels achieved in the United States in the early 1950s, but Boyd and his business partners worked aggressively to globalize the commercial intertext that was helping to construct the new American child. And though cultural and economic obstacles ultimately prevented the full realization of the Boyd company's goals, it cannot be said that they did not try. By the late 1950s, even as Hoppy merchandise receded from American store shelves and his programs were increasingly relegated back to the margins of U.S. syndicated television, Boyd continued to push outward, seeking new international markets for the American cowboy icon.⁵⁷

Toward Global TV. In 1958, after a particularly successful worldwide Hoppy promotion tour, an exhausted Maggie Cherry returned home to her job as Boyd's business manager. She had just helped secure dozens of new contracts for radio and television programming, in countries ranging from Indonesia to Morocco. Paul Talbot of Fremantle wrote in a congratulatory telegram, "Well, my wig's off to you. How you managed to transact so much business in such a short time is utterly beyond my comprehension—and I can just see little native children with nothing on but Hoppy badges."⁵⁸ The global commodity empire embodied in that power-laden image never fully developed, though the precedents established by Boyd's operations helped make future commodity empires possible. And while it was ultimately larger, more diversified corporations—most notably Disney—that developed global commercial intertexts of enduring popularity and profit, the case of *Hopalong Cassidy*, William Boyd Enterprises, and the Fremantle Corporation offers a crucial glimpse into the early history of television globalization.⁵⁹ What would eventually become a multibillion-dollar television syndication industry developed not as an outlet for the products of emergent multinational media corporations, but through the strategies of independent companies that were at the margins of the U.S. television industry of the 1950s. While it is tempting to consider transmediation, franchising, and international distribution as opportunistic empire-building strategies for media corporations at the height of their game,

there is ample evidence that, at least in some key early cases, they can be better understood as survival strategies for relative outsiders.

Even more importantly, this first foray into international television syndication was only secondarily about selling television programs. Television program sales, both domestic and international, were never more than a small slice of the Hopalong market. The distributor Fremantle was actively working to lay the foundations of what would become a highly profitable international syndicator (still in operation today, Fremantle syndicates *Baywatch* and other popular U.S. programming around the world, and founder Paul Talbot remained president of the company until his death in 2005). But for Boyd Enterprises, programming was only one aspect of an intertext whose real profits lay elsewhere. The commercial value of this intertext lay less in the presumptive primary text—the films and television programs—than in the medium-independent, endlessly malleable Hoppy brand. And just as the economic value of Hoppy lay outside any media text, so might have its cultural impact; we must recognize that what we now think of as the primary text may not, in fact, have been the primary site of cultural activity and meaning-making. Hoppy's curious industrial history offers a lesson to the epistemologies of cultural studies; it reminds us that the theoretical transformations that have relocated the primary site of meaning making from the text to its various intertexts and contexts are themselves historically contingent, deeply intertwined with shifts in the culture industries themselves.

The emergence of Hoppy as a transmedia global brand was also inextricable from shifts in intellectual property law. A number of legal struggles between authors, studios, actors, and licensees were radically reshaping the postwar intellectual property climate, and by the 1950s, trademark rights began consistently to supersede copyright claims. Jane Gaines has noted that “as the preferred theory of legal defense for popular characters, copyright fell out of fashion in the entertainment industry with the often-cited 1954 Sam Spade case,” which centered on whether Warner Bros. or Dashiell Hammett retained rights to the character.⁶⁰ The court ruled that, under the recently implemented U.S. Trademark Act of 1946 (known as the Lanham Act), the author's copyright claim was secondary to the studio's trademark rights, defined as “any word, name, symbol, device or any combination thereof adopted by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others.” During this period, studios also exploited trademark to deny actors merchandising rights to both the characters they played and their own likenesses, and few actors had sufficient influence to maintain those rights. In particular, both Roy Rogers and Gene Autry were engaged in legal battles with Republic Pictures over the control of the original films and the potential impact their circulation could have on the actors' trademarked personae.⁶¹ And, a few years later, Theodor Geisel found himself with little control over a manufacturer's distribution of Dr. Seuss-labeled merchandise, because Geisel had only ever asserted copyright over the intellectual

property; only after licensing a wide range of Seuss merchandise was Geisel able to force the manufacturer to drop its unlicensed products.⁶² Even Disney, widely understood as an innovator in product licensing, failed in 1955 to register the trademark rights to the Davy Crockett character and his coonskin cap; an independent garment manufacturer had already established a precedent in selling the popular items, and Disney largely missed out on the ensuing consumer craze.⁶³ William Boyd, however, had managed to accomplish first what larger media corporations had not; he established a virtually seamless integrated brand identity, with global control over both copyright and trademark. In so doing, Boyd Enterprises helped pioneer the development of the international transmedia commercial intertext that would become a central facet of an emerging global media culture.

Hoppy's global reach also forces us to reconsider the simplistic assumptions we often make about children's culture. *Hopalong Cassidy* was largely promoted in the United States as children's entertainment, and while the program must in part be understood within a framework of normative American postwar child-rearing, boyology, and Momism, its international reach makes an uncomplicated assessment of its "cultural surround" impossible. Hoppy was a complex figure around whom both children and adults worldwide engaged with a rapidly proliferating U.S. consumer culture, though Boyd's representatives clearly struggled to reconcile American assumptions about consumer behavior with local cultural norms. Then, as now, it is striking how often childhood is a key terrain for the negotiation of shifting media technologies, forms, and modes of production and distribution. As Lisa Jacobson and Avi Santo have shown, in the 1930s, *Little Orphan Annie*, *The Lone Ranger*, and other media figures moved fluidly between comics, radio, film, fan clubs, and merchandise, contributing to the creation of a broader U.S. consumer culture.⁶⁴ By the 1940s and 1950s, the children's Western extended and eventually globalized those intertextual marketing strategies, and attempted to export American childhood, while more recent examples of international transmedia intertexts abound, from *Ninja Turtles* to *Pokemon*. The centrality of children's media to transmediation has many likely influences, ranging from the often-marginal industrial status of their producers, to the less-rigid taste hierarchies ascribed to such "low" cultural forms (a Hoppy comic does not "demean" the character's already low cultural value), to the intimate connection of these characters to the consumer-products industries, to the ease with which newness and innovation can be discursively linked to childhood and youth.

Finally, the industrial and cultural history of *Hopalong Cassidy* also complicates some of our implicit assumptions about the historiography of global media. This history suggests that the international marketing of U.S. television was, even from its earliest development in the 1950s, always about more than simply the indiscriminate dumping of cheap standardized American content. As the multinational media empires extended their reach, a generation of scholars developed trenchant critiques of global political economy that challenged the economic

and cultural imperialism of the Western media export machine. In their oft-cited 1974 UNESCO study, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis noted that international television had already become a “one-way street,” with Western media, dominated by U.S. products, filling over half the airtime in a majority of nations with television. The Western economic domination outlined by those scholars rapidly accelerated, leading to our highly consolidated contemporary environment.⁶⁵ More recently, though, scholars have explored how shifts in industrial modes of production and new arenas of cultural exchange have complicated the mechanisms of media globalization and demanded new epistemologies: Joe Straubhaar and Michael Curtin have argued convincingly that while industrial hegemonies still control much of the map, the micro-level practices of both production and reception do not always fit the metaphor of the one-way street.⁶⁶ But still, implicit in this historiography is something of an intellectual history of media studies; it is easy to allow the crucial foundational work by critics like Herb Schiller and Nordenstreng and Varis to become the de facto consensus early history of global media—that is, as a movement from macro to micro accounts of media flows.⁶⁷

I would like to urge caution in allowing the narrative of a field to become the narrative of a medium. The presumptive narrative of transformation—from an industrial system of Western export to a more dynamic system of economic and cultural negotiations—is too neat a story. Instead, in the distribution, marketing, and reception practices associated with early children’s Westerns, we can see the roots of what we now think of as “glocalization,” the process of hybridizing corporate media products with local reception environments. It is a term with an uneasy discursive lineage, connoting both industrial marketing strategies and critical theories of global-local cultural exchanges. Glocalization’s “diverse overlapping fields of global-local linkages” are not simply a product of late capital, or at least not of our more contemporary understandings of it.⁶⁸ Instead, its roots lie deep. Recent theoretical perspectives on global cultural flows suggest a more complicated past than that described by macro-level political economists, and one in which we can find the seeds of our contemporary global media environment.

Notes

I wish to thank the archival staff at the University of Wyoming American Heritage Center for their exceptional research support, and Mary Celeste Kearney, Thomas Schatz, Charles Ramirez-Berg, Joe Straubhaar, and the anonymous *Cinema Journal* reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

1. J. Fred McDonald, *Who Shot the Sheriff? The Rise and Fall of the Television Western* (New York: Praeger, 1986), 15.
2. Christopher Anderson, *Hollywood TV: The Studio System in the 1950s* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 181.
3. See, for example, Morleen Getz Rouse, *A History of the FW Ziv Radio and Television Syndication Companies, 1920–1960* (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1976); Mark Alvey, “The Independents: Rethinking the Television Studio System,” *The Revolution*

- Wasn't Televised: Sixties Television and Social Conflict*, ed. Lynn Spigel and Michael Curtin (New York: Routledge, 1997), 139–58; Tino Balio, ed., *Hollywood in the Age of Television* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); Thomas Schatz, “Desilu, *I Love Lucy*, and the Rise of Network TV,” in *Making Television: Authorship and the Production Process*, ed. Robert J. Thompson and Gary Burns (New York: Praeger, 1990).
4. Denise D. Bielby and C. Lee Harrington, “Opening America? The Telenovela-ization of U.S. Soap Operas,” *Television and New Media* 6, no. 4 (November 2005): 383–99; Timothy Havens, “Exhibiting Global Television: On the Business and Cultural Functions of Global Television Fairs,” *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media* (March 2003): 18–35; Timothy Havens, “‘It’s Still a White World Out There’: The Interplay of Culture and Economics in International Television Trade,” *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 19, no. 4 (December 2002): 377–97; Michael Kackman, “Agents or Technocrats: *Mission: Impossible* and the International Other,” *Citizen Spy: Television, Espionage, and Cold War Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005). See also Andrea Esser, “The Transnationalization of European Television,” *Journal of European Area Studies* 10, no. 1 (2002): 13–29.
 5. Oliver Jensen, “Hopalong Hits the Jackpot,” *Life*, June 12, 1950, 63.
 6. John Reber, interdepartmental NBC memo to Ernie Theiss, September 12, 1949, National Broadcasting Company Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin (hereafter NBC-SHSW) Box 261, folder 10, Tom McFadden Papers, “Hopalong Cassidy, 1949.”
 7. Dan Jenkins, “King TV,” *Tele-Views*, May 12, 1950. As early as 1949, a New York station had already run every available episode at least three times, and they recycled the episodes completely once a year. Letter from Ray Kelly to John Heber, “New Hopalong Cassidy films,” December 28, 1949, NBC-SHSW, Tom McFadden papers, box 261, folder 10, “Hopalong Cassidy, 1949.”
 8. “Hopalong Cassidy Prices,” April 1950, NBC-SHSW, Box 593, folder 25, Carleton Smith papers, “Hopalong Cassidy, 1950.”
 9. Russ Johnston, interdepartmental NBC memo to Tom McFadden, August 9, 1949, NBC-SHSW Box 261, folder 10, Tom McFadden Papers, “Hopalong Cassidy, 1949.”
 10. These distribution conflicts were especially acute with the Biow Company, a Boston advertising agency that got wedged between NBC and Toby Anguish’s Television Pictures Distributing Corporation. Summarized in memo from Robert Myers to Carleton Smith, April 18, 1950, NBC-SHSW, Box 593, folder 26, Carleton Smith papers, “Hopalong Cassidy, 1950–II.”
 11. Letter from Hugh A. L. Halff, president of WOAI, San Antonio, to Niles Trammell, chairman of NBC, February 13, 1950, NBC-SHSW, Box 593, folder 26, Carleton Smith papers, “Hopalong Cassidy, 1950–II.”
 12. “NBC Television Network Hopalong Cassidy April 28, 1952 Agreement Summary,” NBC Television Controller’s Department, May 7, 1952, NBC-SHSW, Box 567, folder 15, Ed Madden papers, “Hopalong Cassidy, 1952.”
 13. *Ibid.* Among the Hopalong Cassidy films produced by United Artists and subsequently recut into half-hour television programs were the following: *In Old Colorado* (1941), *Range War* (1939), *Outlaws of the Desert* (1941), *Fool’s Gold* (1947), and *Dangerous Venture* (1947). Cutting scripts in the United Artists Collection, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Series 5.3, Boxes 4, 7, and 9, “Dialogues, 1928–56.”
 14. This was roughly the same as the production costs for the Hoppy features Boyd produced in the 1940s. See Collie Small, “Old Hopalong Can’t Miss,” *Saturday Evening Post*, June 14, 1947, 163.
 15. William Boyd, “Bill Boyd: You’d Hardly Recognize Hoppy in these New-fangled TV Films!” in *Who’s Who in Western Stars* (1953), 84.

16. "Statement of Royalties Payable for the month ending August 31, 1950," U.S. Time Corporation to Hopalong Cassidy Enterprises. William Boyd Collection, University of Wyoming American Heritage Center (hereafter, WB) Box 35, folder "U.S. Time Corp Royalty Reports."
17. "Put America's #1 Salesman On Your Team ... Selling Your Dairy Products," 1952 endorsement promotional kit, p. 4, WB Box 41, folder, "Boyd 1954."
18. "The BIG VALUE of our HOPALONG CASSIDY Dairy Program is that in almost every market the HOPPY SHOW IS ALREADY SPONSORED. This means that the companies joining our dairy programs for these towns and cities GET THE ADVANTAGE OF THE TV SHOW _____ BUT _____ AT NO COST TO THEM." "Put America's #1 Salesman On Your Team ... Selling Your Dairy Products," 1952, endorsement promotional kit, p. 10, WB Box 41, folder "Boyd 1954."
19. William Boyd, letter to Carleton Smith, NBC, July 25, 1950, NBC-SHSW Box 593, folder 25, Carleton Smith papers, "Hopalong Cassidy, 1950."
20. American Research Bureau and Audience Research, Inc. research data, Robert McFadyen, interdepartmental memo to Robert White, September 4, 1951, NBC-SHSW, Box 567, folder 16, Ed Madden papers, "Hopalong Cassidy, 1950-1951." See also press release, "Program Facts," May 1955, NBC-SHSW, Box 145, folder 70, Radio Audience Promotion Files; "Hopalong Cassidy Sales" memo, NBC-SHSW, Box 567, folder 15, Ed Madden papers, "Hopalong Cassidy, 1952." Although these programs were largely marketed as a family programs, and were often sponsored by bakeries, in New York City *Hopalong Cassidy* was sponsored by Saks Fifth Avenue. Memo from John Heber to Ernie Theiss, September 12, 1949, NBC-SHSW, box 261, folder 10, Tom McFadden papers, "Hopalong Cassidy, 1949."
21. Mary Celeste Kearney, "Recycling Judy and Corliss: Transmedia Exploitation and the First Teen-Girl Production Trend," *Feminist Media Studies* 4, no. 3 (November 2004): 281. See also Thomas Doherty, *Teenagers and Teenpics: The Juvenilization of American Movies in the 1950s* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
22. Eileen Meehan, "Holy Commodity Fetish, Batman! The Political Economy of a Commercial Intertext," in *The Many Lives of the Batman: Critical Approaches to a Superhero and His Media*, ed. Roberta E. Pearson and William Uricchio (New York: Routledge, 1991), 47-65.
23. For profiles of the early development of Disney, see Janet Wasko, *Understanding Disney: The Manufacture of Fantasy* (New York: Polity Press, 1994); Anderson, *Hollywood TV*; and Eric Smoodin, ed., *Disney Discourse: Producing the Magic Kingdom* (New York: Routledge, 1994).
24. Small, "Old Hopalong Can't Miss," 167.
25. Jack Hirshberg, "Millionaire on Horseback," *New Liberty*, December 1950, 72.
26. Jane Pelgram, "If It's Good Enough for Hoppy ..." *Radio and Television Life*, July 17, 1949, 73-74.
27. *Ibid.*, 39.
28. Two million U.S. kids were members of his Troopers' Clubs, "all of whom wear badges, know secret code words, and agree to be true to the principles of honesty and fair play." Dwight Whitney, "The Inside Story of Hopalong Cassidy," *Coronet*, December 1950, 92.
29. Jensen, "Hopalong Hits the Jackpot," 69.
30. Whitney, "Inside Story of Hopalong Cassidy," 92.
31. "Manners and Morals: Kiddies in the Old Corral," *Time*, November 27, 1950.
32. Sean Griffin, "Kings of the Wild Backyard: Davy Crockett and Children's Space," in *Kids Media Culture*, ed. Marsha Kinder (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 1999), 102-21.

33. Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Post-war America* (New York: Knopf, 2003).
34. Jenkins, "King TV," 7.
35. "Manners and Morals."
36. Whitney, "Inside Story of Hopalong Cassidy," 92.
37. Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis, *Television Traffic—A One-Way Street? A Survey and Analysis of the International Flow of Television Programme Material* (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 1974), 12, 40.
38. Letter from Paul Talbot of Fremantle Inc. to Marguerite Cherry, HCWHTC, March 2, 1955, WB Box 63, "Foreign Television—HCWHTC Contracts."
39. *Ibid.*
40. "Hoppy Bows on TV in Wild West Germany," *Radio-TV Daily*, December 8, 1958. Further documented in WB Box 63.
41. Letter from Paul Talbot of Fremantle Inc. to Marguerite Cherry, HCWHTC, August 29, 1955, WB Box 63.
42. Contract between William Boyd and Cirquito CMQ, September 1, 1953, WB Box 93, "Television Foreign—Cuba."
43. "Transcribed Message to the Children of the Henderson Street Public School, Glasgow, Scotland," recorded June 26, 1952, WB Box 40, folder "Boyd 1952."
44. Letter from Paul Talbot of Fremantle Inc. to Marguerite Cherry, HCWHTC, March 24, 1955, WB 63, "Foreign Television—HCWHTC Contracts"
45. Letter from Paul Talbot of Fremantle Inc. to Bob Stabler, HCWHTC, April 19, 1954, WB Box 63.
46. Canada offered one of the first challenges due to slight differences in trademark law, requiring intervention as early as 1950, WB Box 40, folder "Boyd 1951."
47. Marguerite Cherry, letter to Phillippe Regnault, Opera Mundi, April 8, 1957, WB Box 63, folder "France—Opera Mundi."
48. Dan Grayson, memo to Marguerite Cherry, March 26, 1953, WB Box 63.
49. Notification of Quitclaim, March 1, 1954, C. Huston, NBC to HCWHTC, WB Box 63.
50. R. Stabler, memo to Marguerite Cherry, February 12, 1954, WB Box 63.
51. Lewis Pennish, Hopalong Cassidy Enterprises, letter to Rene Anselmo, August 23, 1955, WB Box 63.
52. Letter from Rene Anselmo of Fremantle Inc. to Marguerite Cherry, HCWHTC, July 27, 1955, WB Box 63.
53. Martin Stone, quoted by Dan Grayson, memo to Marguerite Cherry, December 17, 1953, WB Box 63.
54. "It seems there is sufficient grounds to confirm our previous analysis to the futility of utilizing a Western Hemisphere Corporation for the merchandising of Hopalong goods. With the exception of Venezuela, which has the money, I do not believe any opportunity exists to launch a program and expect compensation on its investment." Dan Grayson, memo to Marguerite Cherry, December 17, 1953, WB Box 63. Letter from Naomi Kopp of Fremantle Inc. to Marguerite Cherry, HCWHTC, September 27, 1955, WB Box 63.
55. Phillippe Regnault, Opera Mundi, letter to Marguerite Cherry, February 9, 1961, WB Box 63, folder "France—Opera Mundi." Local brokers like Opera Mundi would receive a 25 percent commission on licensing fees collected—75 percent went to Boyd. See, for example, the contract between Opera Mundi and William Boyd, May 21, 1957, WB Box 63, folder "France—Opera Mundi."
56. Daniel Thomas Cook, *The Commodification of Childhood: The Children's Clothing Industry and the Rise of the Child Consumer* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,

- 2004); Nicholas Sammond, "Manufacturing the American Child: Child-rearing and the Rise of Walt Disney," *Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies* 13, no. 1 (1999): 29–55. See also Nicholas Sammond, *Babes in Tomorrowland: Walt Disney and the Making of the American Child, 1930–1960* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005).
57. By 1959, Hoppy program sales across the United States and Canada had dwindled to a trickle, and Fremantle estimated total international gross sales of \$50,000–\$60,000 annually for the next five years. Letter from Paul Talbot of Fremantle Inc. to Marguerite Cherry, December 10, 1958, WB Box 93, "Television Foreign Television–Fremantle International."
 58. Letter from Paul Talbot of Fremantle Inc. to Marguerite Cherry, December 10, 1958, WB Box 93.
 59. Disney has for decades been a site of critical analysis regarding issues of cultural imperialism and global media flows, beginning with work such as Mattelart and Dorfman, *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperial Ideology in the Disney Comic* (New York: International General, 1984), or, more recently, Wasko, *Understanding Disney*.
 60. Jane Gaines, *Contested Culture: The Image, The Voice, The Law* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 211.
 61. *Ibid.*, 169.
 62. Philip Nel, "The Disneyfication of Dr. Seuss: Faithful to Profit, One Hundred Percent?" *Cultural Studies* 17, no. 5 (2003): 579–614.
 63. Griffin, "Kings of the Wild Backyard," 112–13.
 64. Lisa Jacobson, *Raising Consumers: Children and the American Mass Market in the Early Twentieth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Avi Santo, "Transmedia Brand Licensing Prior to Conglomeration: George Trendle and the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet Brands, 1933–1966" (PhD diss., University of Texas, 2006).
 65. Edward S. Herman and Robert W. McChesney, *Global Media: The New Missionaries of Global Capitalism* (New York: Cassell, 1998).
 66. Joseph D. Straubhaar, *World Television: From Global to Local* (London: Sage, 2007), and "Beyond Media Imperialism: Assymetrical Inter-dependence and Cultural Proximity," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 8 (1991): 39–59; Michael Curtin, "Media Capitals: Cultural Geographies of Global TV," in *Television After TV: Essays on a Medium in Transition*, ed. Jan Olsson and Lynn Spigel (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004).
 67. Herbert Schiller, *Communication and Cultural Domination* (New York: ME Sharpe, 1976).
 68. Wayne Gabardi, *Negotiating Postmodernism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 33–34.